Decision-making mechanisms in international organizations and collective supranational bodies
Abstract
The article is devoted to the decision-making and voting mechanisms in international organizations, including voting by majority, exercise of the “veto” right, establishing coalitions in collective supranational bodies. The author uses mathematical methods, in particular the theory of coalition games, as an instrument of analysis. The author concludes about decision-making procedures in international organizations after 1990 and in the context of Eurasian integration.
Keywords:
law of international organizations, connection between international relations and international law, voting, veto, coalitions, mathematical methods, game theory, Banzhaf index, Shapley Shubik index
Downloads
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Articles of "Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Law" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
